

Conference on Disarmament

1 May 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 30 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the statement issued at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) held in Hiroshima on 12 April 2014

I have the honour to transmit to you on behalf of twelve member states of the "Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative" (NPDI), Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, the text of the Hiroshima statement issued at the 8th Non-Proliferation Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) Ministerial Meeting held in Hiroshima on 12 April 2014.

I would be grateful if the joint statement would be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in the work of the conference.

(Signed): Toshio Sano
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

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Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 8th Ministerial Meeting

Hiroshima, April 12, 2014

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) - Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates - gathered here in Hiroshima, where an atomic bomb was dropped for the first time in human history, and witnessed first-hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of an atomic bombing that last even to this present day. We were touched very deeply by the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors (Hibakushas) and reinforce our commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, we invite the world's political leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to also witness the consequences with their own eyes.
2. We are committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and as the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We stress the importance of universal adherence to the NPT and call on all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it immediately as non-nuclear-weapon States.
3. We reaffirm our commitment and shared purpose as declared in our first Ministerial Statement in September 2010, which is to take forward the consensus outcome of the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the NPT and to jointly advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes. We reaffirm our commitment to actively contribute to the 2015 NPT review process, including the upcoming Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (Third PrepCom), among others, by submitting working papers to promote discussion and understanding on the following subjects: nuclear disarmament in the post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) era, increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, de-alerting, nuclear security, a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and NPT withdrawal.
4. With the 2015 NPT RevCon fast approaching, we urge all the States Parties to fully comply with the obligations and commitments, particularly with the full and prompt implementation of all the actions in the 2010 Action Plan. For its part, the NPDI has been devoting, and will continue to devote, attention to elements for consideration in a consensus outcome document for the 2015 NPT RevCon. In our view, the 2015 NPT RevCon should review the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan and, with an eye towards the next 2020 NPT review cycle, seek to strengthen all three pillars of the NPT— nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a diverse cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States, we can play a constructive and proactive role in bridging diverse positions to help craft a successful outcome at the 2015 NPT RevCon, with progress across all the pillars of the NPT.
5. We reaffirm that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, we stress the need for a systematic and continued reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, by all States possessing nuclear weapons, in a pragmatic and step by step approach aiming at their total elimination.
6. We recall that the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking in the 2000 NPT RevCon to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and this generated a process that would lead to their elimination. At the 2010 NPT RevCon, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to unequivocally accomplish the total

elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI and committed to accelerate progress on steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

7. In this regard, we welcome bilateral disarmament measures by Russia and the United States such as in their New START Treaty and encourage them to continue discussions on follow-on measures to the New START Treaty to achieve even deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We were encouraged by US President Obama's proposals in his speech in Berlin in June 2013, in which he stated the US intention to seek additional negotiated cuts with Russia and move beyond Cold War nuclear postures. We expect the proposals to lead to progress in negotiations on comprehensive reductions of all types of nuclear weapons.

8. While recognizing the positive impact of unilateral and bilateral reductions, we believe that they do not replace multilateral negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of all types of nuclear weapons.

9. We are deeply concerned about the reported build-up of nuclear arsenals, against the clear intent of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We urge those not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals with the objective of their total elimination.

10. Increasing the transparency of information about nuclear forces has also been an issue of great importance to the NPT. Without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be verified nor would NPT States Parties have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to use an agreed standard reporting form to meet their obligations to report their disarmament undertakings to the upcoming Third PrepCom. We urge them to build upon this effort by submitting further substantive, timely and meaningful reports at future NPT meetings on their nuclear disarmament undertakings to fulfil their NPT Article VI commitments.

11. Quantitative reductions should be accompanied by steps towards reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security strategies and military doctrines. These steps are important contributions towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament and will be mutually reinforcing with further quantitative reductions. While we acknowledge steps that have been taken in this regard, we urge nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons and urge others who have not done so to start reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and military doctrines.

12. De-alerting nuclear forces is also important not only as a step towards a world free of nuclear weapons, but also to avoid and reduce the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from any unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to take concrete and meaningful steps, whether unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally, to implement Action 5(e) and 5(f) in the 2010 Action Plan, which, inter alia, call for reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.

13. We are deeply concerned and frustrated with the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We regret that the CD has failed to fulfil its mandate as the single multilateral disarmament negotiations forum of the international community for more than 18 years. It is time for the CD's Member States to take bold steps towards fulfilling the CD's mandate and resume negotiations.

14. As an essential step towards a world free of nuclear weapons, the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and universally and effectively verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) that serves both disarmament and non-proliferation purposes remains a priority. We welcome and look forward to the work of the

group of governmental experts (GGE) on this issue, which just ended its first session yesterday, in Geneva. We urge the CD to launch negotiations on such a treaty as soon as possible. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, all nuclear-weapon States and other States in possession of nuclear weapons should declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

15. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also an essential component for achieving nuclear disarmament. We welcome the recent ratification of the Treaty by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, and Niue bringing the total number of ratifications to 162. Although the Treaty, 18 years after opening up for signatories, is yet to come into force, we believe that the prohibition of nuclear tests as envisioned by the Treaty has become a de facto international norm. However, without the legally-binding effect of entry into force of the Treaty, such a norm remains fragile. We therefore urge those States whose last remaining signatures and ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT to sign and ratify without delay.

16. We are committed to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system. We consider the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in combination with an Additional Protocol, to be the international verification standard and call upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude and implement an Additional Protocol without delay. We stand ready to share our experiences and best practices, as well as legal and practical assistance, in cooperation with the IAEA.

17. Furthermore, we underscore the crucial role of export controls to support the fulfilment of nuclear non-proliferation obligations under paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT. We encourage all States to establish, develop, and maintain appropriate and effective national export controls for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods, equipment and technology. We stand ready to share our individual experiences in the field of export control with other States.

18. Recognizing the serious threat of nuclear terrorism, we reaffirm our commitment in working together to strengthen nuclear security, including to fully implement relevant international requirements. We welcome The Hague Communiqué adopted at the third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held in the Netherlands, from 24th to 25th March 2014. The members of NPDI fully support the objectives of the NSS to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. We also reaffirm the essential responsibility and the central role of the IAEA in the international nuclear security architecture.

19. We strongly condemn North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs which undermine the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime as well as pose a great threat to regional and global peace and stability. We condemn and express grave concern at the ballistic missiles launches conducted by North Korea on March 26 (local time), following the launches on March 3. These launches are clear violations of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We strongly urge North Korea to comply with its commitments under the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement and obligations under all the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and to return to compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and the NPT. Furthermore, we urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions including, among others, ballistic missile launch, nuclear test or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We also deplore the announcement and the efforts by North Korea to readjust and restart the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and urge North Korea to cease all nuclear activities immediately.

20. We welcome the start of the implementation of the first-steps under the Joint Plan of Action and hope that the on-going negotiations of the E3+3 with Iran will lead to the final and comprehensive resolution of Iran's nuclear issue. In particular, we urge Iran to swiftly

and steadily implement measures, such as the ratification and implementation of its Additional Protocol, to remove international concerns regarding its nuclear activities. In addition, we urge Iran to fulfil the requirements of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors. In this context, we welcome the Framework for Cooperation and the steps implemented to date and fully support the efforts by the E3 + 3 as well as the IAEA. In particular, while respecting Iran's right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the NPT and other relevant obligations, we support the IAEA's efforts to resolve international concerns and all outstanding issues regarding Iranian nuclear activities including Possible Military Dimensions and call upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA also in this respect.

21. The NPDI, as a group of non-nuclear-weapon States which are committed to promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is following with grave concern the situation in Ukraine, which has been the subject of intensive discussions amongst ourselves as well as at the United Nations General Assembly. The NPDI expects international obligations and commitments to be respected, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

22. We emphasize that the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned is an important measure in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process. We therefore call on all nuclear-weapons States to recognize the value of NWFZs, such as those established by the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok, by securing ratifications of relevant protocols without reservations contrary to those Treaties' object and purpose.

23. We regret that the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which is an essential and integral part of the final outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, has still not been held. We welcome the ongoing consultations among the relevant parties to address outstanding issues and call for the earliest possible convening of a successful conference with the participation of all States of the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. We support the facilitator in his efforts to realize this outcome and call upon the States in the region to engage in a spirit of constructive cooperation that will lead to an inclusive, substantive and goal-oriented conference and follow-up steps.

24. The testimonies of Hibakushas serve as a reminder to us all of why a nuclear war should never be fought. The devastating impact of nuclear weapons has motivated humanity's aspirations to achieve and sustain the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, which is reflected in the first resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 1946. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been reflected in numerous multilaterally negotiated instruments, including the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty, as well as the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1).

25. We urge all States to reiterate their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, as expressed in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document. In view of such consequences, it is in the interest of all nations that the nearly 69 year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

26. The catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons fundamentally underpins all work to succeed in our non-proliferation efforts and to achieve nuclear disarmament in pursuit of a more secure world, particularly through the NPT. The ongoing discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be inclusive and universal as well as a catalyst for a united global action towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. For

this purpose, we encourage all States to contribute actively and constructively in all fora to pursue practical and effective measures that will strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, while dealing with diverse nuclear risks.

27. In order to foster further momentum for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, we stress the significance of spreading awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations. Through disarmament and non-proliferation education and translation of Hibakushas' testimonies into multiple languages, messages have been sent to the world about the consequences that nuclear weapons bring. Such endeavours should continue. Efforts to further deepen our understanding of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons based on fact-based scientific studies are important. We welcome all such recent efforts, including during the Conferences on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo in March 2013 and Nayarit in February 2014. In this regard, we take note of the offer by the Austrian Government and are looking forward to further discussions on its plans for the next Conference on this issue to be held in Vienna later this year.

28. We recognize the significant role of civil society, and accordingly, the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education. On the margins of this Hiroshima Ministerial Meeting, we had a welcome opportunity to engage with civil society, including NGOs, students from NPDI Member States, academics and the media. We will continue our engagement with civil society in pursuit of our common objectives.

29. We call upon all NPT States Parties to take part in the Third NPT PrepCom in a spirit of cooperation and good faith, which would maintain the constructive atmosphere created at the previous PrepComs and carry forward that spirit to the Review Conference in 2015. It is the responsibility of all NPT States Parties to fulfil their commitments and obligations under the NPT regime and to work to uphold and strengthen that regime, including through achieving a successful outcome at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Conference on Disarmament

21 May 2014

English

Original: Russian

Note verbale dated 19 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the comments by the Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Anatoly I. Antonov, on the remarks made by representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States of America on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border with Ukraine

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations office and other international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to enclose comments made by the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Mr. Anatoly Antonov, dated 8 May 2014, with a request to distribute it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

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Comments by the Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Anatoly I. Antonov, on claims by representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States of America that there are no indications of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border with Ukraine

"In the last day, official representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States of America have reported that they have no indication that the positions of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine have changed. As usual, our colleagues from NATO, and especially those from the United States, did not bother to provide any evidence to support their position.

In this connection I should like to emphasize that up until now not a single State of the North Atlantic Alliance, including the United States, has presented us with a formal claim that the Russian Federation has failed to comply with or has directly violated its international obligations in the field of conventional weapons. That notwithstanding, our western partners have assiduously tried to convince us to demonstrate 'unilateral transparency' and to grant access for additional inspection missions in the territory of the Russian Federation.

This was specifically the topic of discussion during a recent telephone conversation between the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation and the United States Secretary of Defense. During the conversation, General Sergei Shoigu of the Russian army informed his counterpart that following exercises by Russian units at the end of April in districts along the Ukrainian border, the units had been withdrawn to their permanent bases.

In this connection, we should like to note the following. In the past two months, in accordance with the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna document of 2011, we have facilitated about a dozen inspection measures, including a special observation flight by Ukraine in the border region of the Russian Federation.

In addition, on 6 May the joint group for the Treaty on Open Skies consisting of Norway and the United States carried out its regular observation flight along the border with Kharkiv and Luhansk Provinces of Ukraine. On 7 May it carried out a flight south of Bryansk, along an area near towns in the vicinity of Hlukhiv, in Sumska Province. There was no interference from our side in the selection of the flight path. No undeclared military activity was found to be taking place in these areas.

Official reports drawn up in the presence of representatives of the Russian Federation contain one set of conclusions, but what is then released to the public is contradictory information, consisting of propaganda clichés accusing the Russian Federation of failing to meet its obligations.

To avoid further provocation, we have withdrawn even tactical units that had been conducting drills at training ranges near the border. The Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation specifically informed his counterpart from the United States of this during the telephone conversation.

Against this background, the Ukrainian military is continuing to build up its presence along the Russian-Ukrainian border. A force of some 15,000 Ukrainian troops has been deployed in the border region, and the call for new enlistment has been renewed.

At the same time, NATO has increased its troop contingent in Eastern Europe.

In the context of the continuing crisis in Ukraine, such actions do nothing to help tone down tensions in that country.

For our part, we call upon the 'official representatives' of NATO and the Pentagon to refrain from cynically misleading international public opinion regarding the actual situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border.

It is foolhardy to stubbornly hammer home cold war stereotypes of the last century on the Western public in an age when the Internet and a free press are universally available. Such an approach can only undermine the reputation of those who spread Western propaganda themselves."

Moscow, 8 May 2014

Conference on Disarmament

26 May 2014
English
Original: Russian

Note verbale dated 21 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the statement delivered by Mr. Vitaly Churkin, Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations during the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 6 May 2014 in New York

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to enclose the Statement at the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations H.E. Mr. Vitaly Churkin dated May 6, 2014 with a request to distribute it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

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Statement at the signing ceremony for the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

It is a great pleasure for me to take part in the signing ceremony for the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. This is a momentous event, which in its own way brings closure to years of efforts by our friends and neighbours in Central Asia for the realization of their initiative to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons. With the signing of the Protocol by the nuclear powers, a giant step forward has been taken towards the establishment of the zone in international law. All that is left is for this instrument to be ratified. We plan to do this as soon as possible.

The promotion and success of this initiative bear witness to the commitment of the countries of Central Asia to the non-proliferation regime and to their desire to make a substantive contribution to strengthening strategic stability and international security.

The Russian Federation has steadfastly supported the aspirations of the various regions of the world to establish zones free of nuclear weapons. We have already provided so-called legally binding negative security assurances to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (under the Treaty of Tlatelolco), Africa (the Treaty of Pelindaba) and the South Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty). Now it is the turn of Central Asia, a region of States with which the Russian Federation has had close ties for many centuries.

Most of the nuclear powers, including the Russian Federation, present negative security assurances with accompanying interpretative statements or reservations. We will do so this time as well, submitting a note verbale to the depositary of the Treaty. I should like to emphasize that the note will contain the standard reservations made in accordance with our military doctrine. As we can see from the years of experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, this will have no detrimental effect on the security of the States parties.

It is noteworthy that the Protocol to the Treaty is being signed at today's ceremony by all the nuclear powers, all at the same time. This is the first time we have seen such a practice. It is no less noteworthy that the signing is taking place during the third session of the preparatory committee for the 2015 review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This provides yet another symbol of the important contribution the Central Asian countries and the nuclear powers have made to the strengthening of the NPT regime.

New York, 6 May 2014